We consider the problem of how to apply a gsp auction to a buyer-seller network. Generalized second price (gsp) auctions are often used to sell online ads where buyers care about the position or placement of the ad. GSP auctions can also be applied to wireless data transmissions with congestion where buyers care about the speed of data transmission; however, such an auction would take place over a network as a buyer could only purchase from a seller (or cell tower) that he was linked to (or was close to). Two possible gsp auctions over a network are considered: separate gsp auctions and integrated gsp auctions. The eciency of these two auctions is examined with eciency favoring the integrated auction.
Introduction
Generalized second price (gsp) auctions are known for their use in online search advertising. Here advertisers announce bids for keywords and then the ads are displayed in ranked positions where the advertiser who bids the most receives the top position and thus should receive the most clicks per ad. GSP auctions can also be applied to the problem of radio spectrum pricing with congestion due to limited bandwidth; see Chen, Jana and Kannan (2011) . Here wireless consumers would submit a bid for a unit of data and a cell tower would prioritize its transmission of data based on bids. Thus, the highest bidder would receive the fastest transmission of data.
One dierence between applying the gsp auction to wireless data transmission versus online search ads is that wireless data transmission takes place over a network of consumers and cell phone towers where a consumer can only purchase a unit of data from a tower that he is close (or connected) to and such a consumer may be close (or connected) to multiple towers. We consider the problem of how to apply a gsp auction to such a network.
Two possible gsp auctions are considered over a network where a buyer can only enter a seller's auction if the two are linked. The rst considered is separate gsp auctions where each seller holds their own gsp auction and each buyer can enter only one auction even if such a buyer is linked to multiple sellers. We show that there exists a feasible assignment of buyers to sellers which respects the graph such that the separate auctions result in an ecient allocation of goods. However, if a buyer chooses to enter an auction where he does not displace another buyer instead of choosing an auction where he does displace another buyer, then the separate auctions may result in an inecient allocation of goods.
The second auction considered is an integrated gsp auction where the auction price rises uniformly across sellers (as in Kranton and Minehart (2001) ) and buyers can decide to exit some sellers' auctions or can decide to place a drop out bid with one particular seller. Thus, a buyer with multiple links can initially observe all of his linked sellers' auctions, but can only place a drop out bid in one auction. We show that such an integrated auction will be more likely to results in an ecient allocation of goods.
There is a large and growing literature which examines generalized second price auctions and online advertising where advertisers care about the position that their ad is displayed in; see Varian (2007) , Varian and Harris (2014) , and Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) . Recent work has focused on eciency of gsp auctions (see Gomes and Sweeney (2014) ), ineciency under uncertainty (see Caragiannis, et al. (2015) ), as well as on seller's revenue (see Yenmez (2014) ). For a model where some advertisers have limited information regarding the value of the display ads, see Arnosti, Beck, and Milgrom (2016) . Lastly, competing ad auctions are modeled as Cournot-style competition in Ashlagi, Edelman, and Lee (2013) . We add to this literature by allowing a gsp auction to occur over a network.
Model
Consider a generalized second price auction that takes place over a network.
Let M = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., m} represent the set of sellers and N = {1, 2, ..., j, ..., n} represent the number of buyers. Each seller i has M i = {1, 2, ..., m i } goods for sale.
The good in the set M i labeled k represents the kth position (or priority) of the goods i has available. In the case of radio spectrum this position represents the speed of data transmission. Thus, a good in the position labeled 1 will have priority over other goods and will have the fastest data transmission. The expected speed received from a buyer whose good has priority k is
The value of a unit of speed to buyer j is v j . Buyer j's payo from receiving a good with priority k is s k · v j . It is assumed that each v j is a random variable independently and identically distributed on [v, v] with continuous distribution F , where v ≥ 0. We assume that v j = v j for all j = j . Additionally, we assume that buyer j would like to purchase at most one unit of the good. Let v ≡ {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n }. An allocation A(g) of goods is feasible in network g if (i) each buyer j receives at most one good; if the good received has priority k and is from seller i then it must be that ij ∈ g and if (ii) each seller i sells at most one good with priority k ≤ m i . LetÂ(g) represent the set of all feasible allocations over g.
is the priority j is assigned in allocation A(g). Thus, we assume that the seller does not consume the good if there is no sale.
We consider two possible generalized second price (gsp) ascending-bid auctions:
an integrated auction and separate auctions. Both auctions are based on the gsp ascending-bid auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) .
In the separate auctions, each seller holds his own gsp ascending-bid auction and buyers linked to multiple sellers can choose one auction to compete in. This choice results in a feasible assignment of buyers to sellers in graph g. 
Results
We compare the integrated auction with the separate auctions to see which is more ecient, which auction is better for the sellers, and which auction is better for the buyers.
First we consider the eciency of the separate gsp ascending-bid auctions.
Consider the separate auctions and let each buyer already have decided which of his connected seller's auctions he will participate in. Consider the separate auction for seller i. Let n i be the number of bidders participating in this auction.
The following Lemma will be used in the proof of Proposition 2. This Lemma is based on Theorem 2 of Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) which assumes a single seller with n i = m i + 1. Lemma 1. In each separate auction there is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium where buyer n(j) receives a good with priority position k and will drop out of the auction at price
) for all n(j) < m i and for n(j) = m i when n i > m i . In all other cases, b (j) = v (j) . Any buyer j such that n(j) ≤ m i receives the good and n(j) receives priority position j; any buyer for which n(j) > m i does not receive a good.
Proof. If m i < n i , then the bidders with the lowest valuations who do not win a good have incentive to bid their own values as their price for the good equals zero and so b j = v j for these bidders. If m i ≥ n i , then again the bidder with the lowest valuation pays price 0 and bids her own value. In either case, consider the decision of when to drop out for any other bidder, say bidder j. Let the number of bidders remaining in the auction (including j) equal k. Thus, if j is the next to drop out, then he will win a good with priority k at a per speed price of b k+1 giving him a payo of s k (v j − b k+1 ). Or j could stay in the auction. He will be willing to stay in the auction and win a good with priority k + 1 as long as the price, say b, he pays gives him a payo of at least s k (v j − b k+1 ). Thus, j stays in the auction as long as
is increasing in v j it will always be that agents with larger valuations stay in the auction longer for each priority position. Thus, the agent n(j) will receive priority position j.
Proposition 2. There exists a feasible assignment of buyers to sellers in graph g such that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the separate aucitons results in an ecient allocation of goods.
Proof. Let A * (g) be an ecient allocation of goods. In this allocation, let buyer j ∈ N receive a good from seller i j ∈ M . Next, consider the separate gsp ascendingbid auctions. Before the auctions take place, each buyer with links to multiple sellers must decide which auction to participate in. Let buyer j ∈ N participate in the auction of seller i j ∈ M . Thus, the buyers participating in seller i's auction will be the same buyers who are assigned a good from i in allocation A * (g).
Consider seller i's auction. From Lemma 1 we know that buyer n(j) will receive a good with priority position j for all n(j) ≤ m i . Thus, the buyers with the largest valuations receive the best priority levels. Thus, in seller i's auction it must be that the sum of the payos to seller i and to all of his buyers equals m i j=1 s j ·v (j) which is as large as possible. Therefore, seller i's auction is ecient. Recall that in the separate auctions, the buyers with multiple links were assigned to the same sellers as in the ecient allocation, thus it must be that the sum of the payos to all sellers and to all buyers is also as large as possible, which means that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the separate auctions is ecient.
Consider a buyer j with links to multiple sellers in g. Let all buyers in g have already decided which auctions to participate in except for buyer j. Thus, when j enters the auction the sum of the payos to seller i and his buyers chooses seller 2's auction then he displaces buyer 5 whose valuation is much higher.
Thus the eciency result of Proposition 5 requires that he chooses auction 1.
Proposition 5. Let there exist a buyer j with multiple links in graph g including ij and i j such that j displaces another buyer in both i and i 's auctions. Then the resulting B-N equilibrium allocation will not be ecient for j joining both i and i 's auctions.
Next we consider the integrated auction.
Proposition 6. Let m = 2. In the integrated auction, there is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in bids.
Proof. Let the price start at 0 across both seller's auctions and start increasing at the same rate. Consider buyer j who is linked only to seller i. Buyer j has incentive to drop out of i's auction at the same bid he would do so in the separate auction of Lemma 1. If buyer j is linked to both sellers and exits i's auction before j's drop out bid is reached then the number of bidders remaining in i's auction will decrease an it is possible that j's drop out bid will decrease to below the current bidding price.
If this happens j has incentive to immediately drop out. Next consider a buyer, say j , who is linked to both sellers. Buyer j is essentially bidding in two separate auctions where the bidding price is the same across the auctions. However, j 's drop out price will dier between the two auctions because of dierences in the number of remaining bidders and in the last drop out bid. Buyer j will choose to drop out of the rst auction where the bid reaches his drop out price and will exit the other auction.
Next we consider the eciency of the integrated auction.
Proposition 7. Let m = 2. If there exists an ecienct allocation where all goods are sold, then the B-N equilibrium allocation of the integrated auction is ecient.
